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REPLY POINT I 
- The State's Priority is Illegal -
APPORTIONMENT IS THE ONLY LEGAL AND 
EQUITABLE METHOD TO DISTRIBUTE THIRD PARTY 
TORT SETTLEMENTS. THE RULES IN S.S., WALLACE, 
AND McCOY HAVE NOT DECIDED THE LEGALITY OF 
THE STATE'S PRIORITY LIEN. 
Apportionment of third party tort settlements is the only lawful 
and equitable method of distributing the proceeds of third party tort claims 
between the State, the recipient, and others. The State does not respond to or 
address the issue. Its rather truncated analysis centered on an issue not in 
dispute, the continued viability of the decisions in S.S v. State, 972 P.2d 439 
(Utah 1998), Wallace v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 446 (Utah 1998), and State v. 
McCoy, 2000 UT 39, 999 P.2d 572 (2000). Appellants are not contesting the 
precedents in these three cases. However, the issue of the priority remains 
unresolved, since it was not addressed in these three cases. 
A. Precedent in S.S.* Wallace, and McCoy is Still Valid, 
The State ascribes an incorrect position to appellants, implying 
that appellants still contest the validity of the lien that was validated in S.S., 
Wallace, and McCoy. This is false. Appellants wish to impress upon the Court 
that they do not contest the validity of the State's Medicaid lien. Appellants 
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have not questioned the State's right to assert a lien on settlement proceeds to 
recover medical expenses paid. Appellant's Brief at 12-13. Appellants also 
understand that the settlement proceeds do not become the property of the 
recipient until the State's lien is satisfied. Id. In short, Appellants 
acknowledge that these three cases uphold the validity of the State's Medicaid 
lien under federal and state law. Id. 
The State employs the simplistic argument that the Medicaid lien 
is valid and so the state's priority must be legal, too. It exhaustively argues 
that S.S., Wallace, and McCoy are still good law, which is like shadow boxing 
with yourself, and then completely ignores the issue of the priority. The State 
recognizes that when applying for Medicaid the recipient assigns only his or 
her claim for "for medical care." The State then fails to distinguish the claim 
for medical expenses from the recipient's other claims for permanent disability, 
future rehabilitation, and lost earning capacity, etc. State's Response Brief at 
10. Inexplicably, one searches in vain in the State's Response Brief for any 
mention of the statutory contemplation of claims by the recipient to an injury 
settlement. This was addressed in detail in Appellants' Brief at 15-21. The 
State winds up with the hasty and unfounded assertion that Appellants "fail to 
distinguish these holdings [in&S'., Wallace, and McCoy]" State's Brief at 11. 
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Of course, Appellants have distinguished the holdings in these 
three case (agreeing that the State's lien is lawful under federal law) by 
showing that the issue of the State's priority has not been decided in Utah. 
Appellants' Brief at 12-15. 
B. Issue of the State's Priority Status Remains Unresolved, 
This Court has yet to decide the issue of whether the State's 
priority status as provided in Utah Code Annotated § 26-19-5(l)(b) is legal 
under state and federal statutes. As Appellants established in their brief, state 
and federal law uncontestedly recognize independent claims by the recipient 
for damages other than medical expenses. Appellant's Brief at 15-21. The 
legality of the State's priority (meaning that it is paid in full before any other 
claims are paid) has not been decided or established by this Court. Contesting 
this fact, the State manages to muster a only single conclusory sentence from 
the S.S. ruling which becomes much less convincing when put in context: 
We conclude that the insurance benefits were effectively assigned 
and the repayment of previous Medicaid expenditures takes 
priority over the use of insurance benefits to establish a 
supplemental needs trust. 
State v. S.S., 972 P.2d at 444, quoted in the State's Brief at 10 (bold portion 
omitted by the State). Significantly, when quoting this passage, the State's 
omission of the last six words of this sentence was replaced by its own words 
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"by the injured person." Appellee's Brief at 10. This substitution changed the 
meaning of this sentence significantly when considered in the context of the 
facts in S.S. In that case, the parents of the injured child had recovered against 
the tortfeasor and put all of the proceeds into a special needs trust without 
paying the State at all. S.S., 972 P.2d at 440. If allowed to stand, the State 
would have recovered nothing, not even its proportional share. The Court's 
use of the word "priority" in this clause meant that the settlement proceeds did 
not become the property of the recipient until the State's claim was also settled. 
Appellants accept this tenet. However, there is no evidence from this 
conclusory statement that the Court had decided the validity of the State's 
priority lien status in § 26-19-5(l)(b) or that the State must be paid in full for 
the medical expenses paid. 
Appellants point to the utter absence of any express mention of 
the priority issue in any of the analysis in any of the three aforementioned 
cases. Furthermore, Justice Durham directly contradicts the State's assertion 
in Wallace: 
The briefs also raised the important issue of whether the State has 
apriority lien against the third party and thus recovers 100% of 
its expenses before anyone else collects anything, or whether it 
can recover an amount proportional to the expenses of the other 
claimants. We obviously do not reach this issue in this case. 
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Wallace v. Jackson, 972 P.2d 446, 452 n. 5 (Utah 1998) (emphasis added). 
Notably, the State completely ignores this salient indicator that the legality of 
the priority remains unresolved. The fact that none of the three precedents 
expressly discuss the priority, together with the express disavowal by Justice 
Durham, demonstrates that the validity of the State's priority remains an open 
question for the Court to settle in this case. 
C. Federal Law Does Not Contemplate a Priority Lien, 
The State makes the tortured argument that certain ambiguous 
words in a few federal statutes imply legislative intent on the part of the U.S. 
Congress to grant a priority. State's Brief at 11. It claims that, "The terms 
'retained,' 'reimburse,' and 'remainder' demonstrate legislative intent to grant 
a priority." State's Brief at 11. At best, these federal statutes are vague and 
ambiguous on the point. On the contrary, however, in making this assertion, 
the State completely ignores other statutes in the same section which are 
unambiguous: 
No lien may be imposed against the property of any individual 
prior to his death on account of medical assistance paid or to be 
paid on his behalf under the State plan.. . (exceptions inapposite 
in this case). 
No adjustment or recovery of any medical assistance correctly 
paid on behalf of an individual under the State plan may be made, 
except. . . (exceptions not relevant to plaintiffs in this case). 
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42U.S.C. § 1396p(a)(l) and (b)(1) (2001) (emphasis added). The State's self-
serving reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b)(1992) simply does not square with 
other more explicit bans on making recoveries against the recipient. In the face 
of these restrictions, the argument that federal law supports the priority is 
completely unwarranted. 
REPLY POINT II 
- Hypertechnicah Procedural Objections -
THE STATE'S PROCEDURAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST 
CONTINUATION OF THE UNNAMED CLASS II 
MEMBERS5 CLAIMS FOR ATTORNEY FEES ARE 
CONTRARY TO ESTABLISHED CLASS ACTION AND 
APPELLATE PRECEDENT. 
Significantly, the State raises no substantive arguments against 
Appellants' appeal of the summary judgment order dismissing unnamed Class 
II plaintiffs' claims for attorney fees. Most prominent is the lack of any 
argument countering the application of the McCoy rule to the unnamed 
members of Class II. Ostensibly, the State has dropped its substantive 
opposition to recovery of the fees and now rests only on procedural objections 
to Class IPs recovery of attorney fees wrongfully withheld. The State brings 
forward a cluster of hypertechnical reasons for upholding the summary 
judgment. In response, Appellants will address the following three major 
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issues: (1) proper notice to unnamed class members has neither been ordered 
nor possible to this point in the litigation, (2) unnamed class members will 
likely suffer prejudice should they be forced to re file, (3) the rule in Franks 
warrants reversal of the trial court's ruling, and (4) there was an issue of 
material fact which precluded summary judgment. 
A. Notice Issue. 
Notice to Class II plaintiffs was not ordered by the trial court. The 
case had not progressed to that point because summary judgment was filed by 
the State, and the State had twice refused to release essential information. 
Individual notice would have been given to all class members at the 
appropriate time and in the appropriate manner pursuant to Rule 23 (c)(2) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which states: 
In any class action maintained under Subdivision (b)(3), the court 
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice 
to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. 
Rule 23(c)(2) (2001) (emphasis added). The State makes the spurious 
argument that the requirements of due process were not satisfied with regard 
to Class II because Appellants did not give notice to the unnamed members. 
State's Brief at 11. At the same time, it claimed that Appellants were dilatory 
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in seeking discovery and so the motion to compel a release of a list of Class II 
members by the State was correctly granted. Id. at 15. This is extremely 
disingenuous, since the record will show that appellants had actually scheduled 
a deposition of a State employee for the purpose of learning the identities of 
potential class members, when the deposition was stricken due to the State's 
motion for summary judgment. R. at 707-09. Appellants have been deprived 
of discovery and, therefore, have been unable to give the best notice possible, 
nor have they been ordered to give notice by the trial court. 
After this case is reversed and gets back on track in the lower 
court, the unnamed members of Class II will be easily identifiable. Appellants 
are confident that the State has records of all persons from whom it has made 
recoveries without offsetting for attorney fees. It would certainly have to 
provide this information to the federal government under federal law, so it 
probably already exists in summary form. Appellants sought to discover these 
records so that they could give individual notice to all members of the class. 
This was the abest notice practicable" in this case. However, the State 
vehemently opposed discovery of this list of names at all junctures. 
Appellants5 first motion to compel discovery was denied as the trial court 
granted the State's motion to disqualify. That ruling was eventually 
unanimously reversed by this Court. R. 102-08, 109-10; Houghton v. Dept. of 
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Health, 962 P.2d 58 (Utah 1998). Upon renewed proceedings, Appellants 
again sought to initiate discovery and filed a motion to compel. That motion 
was dismissed after the trial court granted the State's motion for summary 
judgment. R. 544-87. The State has fought tooth and nail to keep this list of 
names from Appellants and now argues with a straight face that Appellants 
have been dilatory, and that the Court should dismiss this appeal because the 
unnamed class members have not been given notice. This argument is spurious 
and portrays a skewed version of the facts. Appellants are prepared to give 
individual notice as required by the rule in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacqueline, 
All U.S. 156, 178 (1974)1 to all members of Class II as soon as the list of 
names becomes available. 
B. Severe Prejudice To Unnamed Plaintiffs. 
Contrary to the State's claims, forcing unnamed members of Class 
II to refile their claims for attorney fees could severely prejudice them due to 
the delay in filing their claims and the costs involved in starting from the 
beginning. Appellants have spent over five years in pursuing their class action 
claims, and this is the second appearance before this Court. If the Court were 
It is widely acknowledged and even indicated by the excerpt of this opinion quoted 
by the State, that this case stands for the proposition that plaintiffs must ordinarily bear the 
cost of notice, not that they must move on their own accord and without order from the court 
to somehow give notice which would not be individual and would not be the best notice 
available here. 
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to simply modify the summary judgment order to be "without prejudice," as 
advocated by the State, unnamed members of Class II would be forced to start 
all over again, to re-certify the classes and incur the additional costs and fees 
of refiling. This result is completely avoided by following valid precedent 
which would allow the Class II plaintiffs to pursue their claims for attorney 
fees. We see an ulterior motive, i.e., a new challenge at the trial court level to 
class certification, which is already established in this case. 
Furthermore, the Appellants have substantial misgivings aboutthe 
potential that subsequently filed claims will be barred by the statute of 
limitations. Even though this Court has issued precedent that seems to toll the 
statute of limitations for putative class members, the applicability to claims for 
attorney fees by unnamed members of Class II is factually distinguishable and, 
therefore, far from certain. Cf. American Tierra v. City of West Jordan, 840 
P.2d 757 (Utah 1992) (holding that commencement of the class action tolls the 
statute of limitations as to all putative class members who would have been 
parties had class certification been approved). If the case is dismissed without 
prejudice, it is highly likely that the new class will be challenged with "new" 
arguments, arguments that have been waived in this case, but not necessarily 
in a future case, by agreeing to certification in the current litigation. This will 
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result in more years of legal wrangling and probably another unnecessary 
appeal. 
C. Franks Warrants Reversal of Summary Judgment 
for Class II Plaintiffs, 
United States Supreme Court precedent in Franks v. Bowman 
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), directly applies to the ruling dismissing 
unnamed Class II plaintiffs on the attorney fees issue and warrants its reversal. 
Inexplicably, the State asserts that Franks is inapposite because the class was 
improperly certified and because of the lack of notice. State's Brief at 16. Of 
course, the lack of notice is a redundancy and Appellants have thoroughly 
treated this issue above. See Reply Point II, Part A. 
As for the attempt to wrest the certification of Class II, the State 
is barred from now contesting this issue by fundamental principles of class 
action and appellate jurisprudence. Class II was properly and unarguably 
certified after the State stipulated to the certification of both classes on 
January 29, 1996. R. 97-100. As the rule in Franks makes clear, once the 
class is certified by the trial court the claims of the unnamed members take a 
life of their own and survive even the dismissal of named plaintiffs5 claims so 
long as they maintain a "concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation 
of the issues." Franks, 424 U.S. at 755-56. The State has not preserved the 
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issue of class certification on appeal and has, therefore, relinquished its ability 
to contest the issue absent a showing of plain error, which it has not alleged. 
Coleman v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98, \ 9, 17 P.3d 1122, 1124 (2000). In fact, the 
State makes this argument out of the blue, without even providing reference to 
any objection to certification in the record. Appellee's Brief at 16. The 
certification issue is therefore waived by the State, and is not properly before 
the Court. It should not be considered. 
The State mistakenly claims that Appellants have failed to 
properly raise the issue of unnamed Class II members who were not reimbursed 
for attorney fees as an issue of fact before the trial court. State's Brief at 16-
17. As the record shows, it was the State that moved for summary judgment 
as to the Class II attorney fee issue. R. 507-09. The burden of proof, therefore, 
fell on the State to establish that there is no issue of material fact. "Unless the 
moving party meets its initial burden to present evidence establishing that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists, the party opposing the motion is under no 
obligation to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue for trial." Badger v. 
Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 752 (Utah 1996). In summary judgment 
proceedings, the State relied on self-serving affidavits of its own employees to 
allege that there was no issue of fact as to any named plaintiffs. R. 575-78. 
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It made no showing whatsoever as to any unnamed plaintiffs.2 Therefore, its 
failure to make any showing as to unnamed members of Class II was 
insufficient and, even considered alone, warrants reversal. Despite the fatal 
insufficiency to the State of this initial showing, Appellants came forward with 
the affidavit of Attorney James D. Vilos proving that at least two of his clients 
had not been allowed to offset their payments to the State for attorney fees. 
R. 632-46. Since "[i]t only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments on 
the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding 
summary judgment," the issue of claims of the unnamed members of Class II 
was properly presented before the trial court. The court erred in granting 
summary judgment in the face of an issue of material fact, and the issue is 
preserved on appeal. HolbrookCo. v. Adams, 524 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975); 
Appellant's Brief at 38. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though the legality of the State's Medicaid lien has been 
established, whether the State's self-granted priority is legal under federal and 
The State's claim that a showing of mootness as to all named plaintiffs alone is 
sufficient for a dismissal of the entire class action was brought before the trial court without 
supporting authority. This was an erroneous and unjust tortuosity of class action law. As 
the Franks standard demonstrates, the claims of a properly certified class survive a showing 
ofmootness on the part ofthe named plaintiffs. Franks v. Bowman Transporlation,424U.S. 
747, 755-56 (1976); Appellant's Brief at 32-36. 
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state law has not been settled by this Court. Appellants submit that the 
resolution of this issue is appropriate at this time and that the only lawful and 
equitable method to distribute the proceeds from the third party tort settlement 
is to apportion them among all who have claims to them. While a recipient has 
assigned his or her claim for medical expenses, Utah state law definitely 
contemplates the recipient's independent claims for all other damages suffered. 
The result will be an equitable apportionment of the proceeds according to the 
relative value of all claims. 
As argued in the main brief, the claims of the named members of 
Class II remain valid. Questions of fact remain. However, even if arguably the 
named class members' claims have been shown to be invalid, the claims of the 
unnamed members of Class II remain valid. They retain the adverseness 
necessary to sharpen the issues before the court and it is appropriate to allow 
the claims of the unnamed members of Class II to proceed. The State has 
wrongfully and illegally failed to pay its share of attorney fees to hundreds if 
not thousands of Utahns contrary to the ruling in McCoy, After the tremendous 
delay and expense that Appellants have endured in this case, they should now 
be allowed to pursue their claims for attorney fees and be given the benefit of 
discovery. This outcome is not only supported by the law, it is the right thing 
to do. 
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DATED this 27th day of December, 2001 
R0BERT B. SYl&S, E^q/ 
Attorney for Appellants^ 
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